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ASSESSING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACT OF 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION  
IN SERIOUS CRIMINAL TRIALS IN JAPAN 
 
Matthew J. Wilson†  
 
Abstract:  In Japan, the idea of citizen involvement in the judicial process has 
gained greater acceptance over the past decade.  On May 21, 2009, Japan implemented its 
saiban’in seido or “lay judge system” as part of monumental legal reforms designed to 
encourage civic engagement, enhance transparency, and provide greater access to the 
justice system.  About eight years before this historic day, a special governmental 
committee known as the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) set forth wide-sweeping 
recommendations for revamping Japan’s judicial system.  The underlying goals targeted 
three pillars of fundamental reform, namely: (i) a justice system that is “easier to use, easier 
to understand, and more reliable;” (ii) a legal profession “rich both in quality and quantity;” 
and (iii) a popular base in which citizens’ trust in the legal system is enhanced through their 
participation in legal proceedings.  The JSRC viewed the judicial system as an engine 
capable of propelling both economic and societal change.  It believed that lay judge 
participation could function as a piston in this engine by helping shift Japan away from 
centralized control and heavy bureaucratic regulation.  Lay participation was consistent 
with the perceived need for Japanese citizens to not only break away from excessive 
dependency on the government, but also to develop greater civic consciousness, become 
more actively involved in public affairs, and better integrate community values into the 
justice system.  
 
From the outset, the creation and implementation of the lay judge system have been 
strongly controlled by the status quo such that direct impact on the outcome of individual 
criminal trials has been minimized.  However, the value of this monumental court reform 
in Japan has been educational, indirect, and real.  This Article examines the direct impact 
of the lay judge system, describes several of the indirect benefits of the new system, and 
then explores the potential of the system going forward.  This analysis is done through the 
lens of Malcolm Feeley’s 1983 work entitled Court Reform on Trial. 
 
Cite as: Matthew J. Wilson, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Assessing the Direct and 
Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Japanese Trials, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
75 (2017). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
  
Japan’s recent implementation of monumental legal and court reforms 
has significantly impacted the courts, the legal system, individuals, and even 
society as a whole.  Interestingly, these reforms did not necessarily stem from 
a concerted public movement, blaring calls for change, extensive media 
pressure, or even foreign influence.  According to many, the justice system 
was not broken.  Rather, major reforms to Japan’s legal and court systems 
evolved in response to increasing concerns about a stagnant economy, 
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mounting debt, and floundering direction.  During the 1990s, Japanese 
policymakers and business leaders progressively believed that widespread 
legal reforms could help spark economic recovery, satisfy evolving needs 
associated with globalization, and prepare the nation for the century ahead.  
 
With an eye on infusing energy into the economy through concrete 
measures and structural solutions, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established a 
special governmental committee in July 1999 known as the Shiho Seido 
Kaikaku Shingikai or the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”).  It was 
significant that the Prime Minister established the JSRC separately from the 
traditional forces of the justice system—the Ministry of Justice, Supreme 
Court, and Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”).1  Because the 
JSRC was answerable directly to the Prime Minister, its mission extended 
well beyond the charge of a conventional committee and its sweeping 
recommendations would be widely regarded and accepted by the government.  
 
One major judicial reform arising from the JSRC’s deliberations 
involved the incorporation of citizens into Japan’s criminal justice system 
through the establishment of saiban’in2 (often translated as “lay judge,” “lay 
assessor,” or “citizen judge”) trials in certain cases.  In Japan’s modern era, 
professional judges had almost exclusively handled the reins of the justice 
system.  Tribunals consisting of one or three professional judges conducted 
criminal trials, civil proceedings, and all appeals in Japan.  Public 
participation in criminal or civil trials as a lay judge or juror was a foreign 
concept.  
 
This new foray by Japan into the world of lay participation in trials 
constitutes one of the most fascinating modern experiments in court reform.  
Before this major court reform, Japan was the lone member of the Group of 
Eight nations without a system requiring citizen participation in the trial 
process.3  Albeit largely misguided, jury trials in the United States and United 
                                                 
1  Caleb Jon F. Vandenbos, Patching Old Wineskins: Heightened Deference Towards Saiban’in 
Findings of Fact on Koso Appeal Is Not Enough, 24 WASH. INT’L L.J. 391, 397 (2015). See also Setsuo 
Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan: An 
Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 314 (2013). 
2   Translated literally, the word saiban’in (裁判員) means “trial member.” It refers to a citizen 
participant serving on a mixed panel of professional judges and citizen judges in the quasi-jury system 
described in this Article.  
3 Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More 
Access, and More Time, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 513–14 (2010) [hereinafter Wilson. Japan’s New 
Criminal Jury Trial System] (citing Lay Judge System Starts in Japan amid Lingering Concerns, Thai Press 
Reps., May 25, 2009, 2009 WLNR 9772569). 
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Kingdom had increasingly come under greater scrutiny and sharper criticism 
in recent decades.4  However, court reformers in Japan, Asia, and other parts 
of the world have conversely gravitated toward citizen participation in the trial 
process.5  
 
At least among reformers and policymakers in Japan (and subsequently 
other East Asian countries), there has been sufficient support to enable citizen 
participation into the criminal justice process to facilitate greater public 
engagement and achieve more transparency.  This phenomenon has been seen 
in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even China.  
 
By way of background, the Diet of Japan adopted a proposal to establish 
mixed or quasi-jury trials pursuant to the saiban’in ho or Act Concerning 
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials (the “Lay Judge Act”) on 
May 21, 2004.6  Based on the JSRC’s recommendations, this transformational 
legislation enabled the creation of saiban’in trials to adjudicate certain serious 
criminal cases.  Pursuant to this Act, the Japanese courts would now select 
citizens to assist in adjudicating cases involving homicide, robbery resulting 
in bodily injury or death, bodily injury resulting in death, unsafe driving 
resulting in death, arson of an inhabited building, kidnapping for ransom, 
abandonment of parental responsibilities resulting in the death of a child, and 
other serious cases involving rape, drugs, and counterfeiting.7   
 
 Stakeholders impacted by this experiment with citizen participation in 
serious criminal cases approached the new saiban’in system and its objectives 
with reactions ranging from excitement to opposition.8  Optimists saw the new 
system as a vehicle for fostering positive societal change, enhancing 
democratic engagement, and bringing transparency to Japan’s sheltered 
criminal justice system.  Conversely, others strongly believed that the court 
system was never broken, and should not be touched by common citizens who 
are inexperienced and generally uneducated in the complexities of the law.9 
 
                                                 
4  Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1349–50 (2012). 
5   MATTHEW J. WILSON, HIROSHI FUKURAI & TAKASHI MARUTA, CIVIL JURY TRIALS IN JAPAN: 
CONVERGENCE OF FORCES 112–33 (2015); Nancy S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and 
Lay Participation: American Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 820–21 (2015).  
6   Saiban’in no Sanka Suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay 
Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 (Japan), translated in Japanese Law Translation, 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Lay Judge Act]. 
7  Id. art. 2.  
8   WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 28–37.  
9  Id.  
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After five years of preparation, saiban’in trials or “lay judge trials” 
officially commenced in 2009.  Here, Japanese voters are enlisted to serve on 
a mixed tribunal consisting of professional judges and lay judges to adjudicate 
a criminal case.  
 
   Because Japan invested extraordinary amounts of time, energy, and 
financial resources in preparing for citizen participation in the new lay judge 
system, the first trial met with enormous anticipation.  This translated into 
much excitement and fanfare for the first lay judge trial.  Traditional and non-
traditional media coverage were at an unparalleled level.10  Obtaining a seat 
in the courtroom was nearly impossible.11  Japan’s efforts and energy in 
rolling out the system were nothing short of remarkable.   
 
Nearly a decade removed from the first trial, it is instructive to analyze 
the success of the system to date and its prospects going forward.  To date, 
many works (including my own) have evaluated the lay judge system from 
various perspectives.  Unlike other articles, however, this work assesses the 
saiban’in system through the theoretical lens set forth in Professor Malcolm 
Feeley’s acclaimed book Court Reform on Trial.12  
 
In his groundbreaking work penned in 1983, Professor Malcolm Feeley 
examines the process of innovation and planned change with a focus on 
several criminal court reforms across the United States during that period.13  
He sets forth a formula for assessing the likely success of criminal court 
reforms.  Also, he identifies potential pitfalls and stumbling blocks along the 
way to successful court reform, and explains why court reform may not 
succeed.  Although Feeley focuses on the United States, his formula can be 
applied to Japan’s experience with lay participation in its criminal justice 
system.  
 
Noting that each stage in the change process of a court system has its 
own distinct challenges and hazards, Professor Feeley advocates that each 
stage of innovative change should be considered separately to best analyze the 
prospects of successful court reform.  Feeley defines the “stages of 
innovation” as i) diagnosis; ii) initiation; iii) implementation; iv) 
                                                 
10   Id. at 40–41.  
11   See Makoto Ibusuki, Quo Vadis? First Year Inspection to Japanese Mixed Jury Trial, 12 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J., 29–31 (2010). 
12  MALCOM FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983). 
13  Id. at 35. 
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routinization; and v) evaluation.14  By separately analyzing these phases in 
the context of one of the major recent changes to the Japanese criminal justice 
system, one can more realistically predict the chances of success.  
 
In evaluating the success of any court reform, Feeley postulates that 
success in the United States is much more likely when i) there are highly 
trained professionals performing complex tasks; ii) authority is diffused and 
flexible rather than centralized; iii) duties are ambiguous rather than formally 
codified; and iv) roles and mobility are flexible rather than rigidly stratified.  
Conversely, he perceives that two primary factors have the potential of 
discouraging innovation.15  Specifically, the higher the volume of production, 
the greater the need for established routine and the lower the incentive to 
change.  Further, the greater that the change emphasizes efficiency, the likelier 
the program change will be discouraged.16   
 
This Article dives into the saiban’in system in the context of Feeley’s 
formula and general observations.  Because this lay judge system is new and 
unique, its progress to date and future prospects are ripe for continued analysis 
and study.17  Before diving into each element associated with reform and 
innovation, it is helpful to establish a foundation for discussion by describing 
the modern history of the Japanese justice system and characteristics of court 
reform. 
   
II. FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
Through a remarkable recovery from the devastation sustained during 
the Second World War, Japan rose to a position of prominence and respect 
across the world.  The country’s post-war development plan, featuring 
market-friendly policies, balanced budgets, and market liberalization, ignited 
rapid economic growth that seemed limitless for decades.18  Between 1955 
and 1973, Japan experienced average growth of up to nine percent per year.19  
As stated by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in 1964, Japan’s “vital challenge . 
                                                 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 38. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 35. 
18  Kazumi Funahashi, Japan’s Post-WWII Recovery Can be a Lesson for the World, DAILY SIGNAL, 
Nov. 19, 2012, http://dailysignal.com/2012/11/19/japans-post-wwii-recovery-can-be-a-lesson-for-the-
world/.  
19  See Wataru Takahashi & Shuji Kobayakawa, Globalization: Role of Institution Building in the 
Japanese Financial Sector, 11 fig. 1 (Bank of Japan, Working Paper No. 03-E-7 2003), 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/wps_2003/data/wp03e07.pdf. 
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. . whether domestically or internationally, is to promote stable economic 
growth and reduce the disparity between the rich and poor.”20  Four years 
later, Japan had become the second largest economy in the world after the 
United States.21  
 
Over time, Japan progressively became renowned for its efficiency, 
quality, and stability.  Now one of the most advanced societies in the world, 
Japan provides its citizens with a high overall quality of life.  Among other 
things, the country has excelled in its per capita income, technological 
advancement, convenience, safety, cleanliness, literacy, and life expectancy.22  
Japan’s “economic miracle” stands as a model for emerging nations and 
economies recovering from difficult circumstances.23 
 
From a political and legal standpoint, Japan became the most 
democratic country in East Asia in the post-war era.  Immediately after Japan 
announced its decision to surrender to the United States in 1945, General 
Douglas MacArthur accepted an appointment as Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (“SCAP”) to oversee the occupation of Japan.  Shortly 
thereafter, he declared, “To the Pacific basin has come the vista of a new 
emancipated world.  Today, freedom is on the offensive, democracy is on the 
march.”24  
 
In effectuating change to the government and legal systems, General 
MacArthur believed that changes should be based on familiar institutions and 
continuity, at least to the extent possible.  Thus, in order to facilitate the 
stabilization and recovery of Japan, SCAP employed as much of the existing 
Japanese governmental structure as possible.25  Naturally, the Allied 
Occupation involved significant changes designed to facilitate a full-scale 
democratic government.26  Without question, the American influence on the 
Japanese judicial and legal systems was significant.27  The influence included 
the adoption of a new constitution primarily drafted by American lawyers, 
new laws modeled after U.S. counterparts, strengthening of the judiciary, and 
                                                 
20 Kuzami Funahashi, supra note 18.  
21  FEELEY, supra note 12, at 36. 
22   WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.  
23   Id.  
24  Gen. Douglas MacArthur, VJ Day Broadcast (Sept. 2, 1945), in GENERAL MACARTHUR: SPEECHES 
AND REPORTS 1908–1964, at 136–38 (Edward T. Imparato ed., 2000). 
25  See Renata Lawson Mack, Reestablishing Jury Trials in Japan: Foundational Lesson from the 
Russian Experience, 2 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 101, 130–31 (2012). 
26  Elliott J. Hahn, Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 522 (1983).  
27  Id.  
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a guaranteed parliamentary system of government.28  The Constitution 
outlined a governmental structure based on the Western concept of separation 
of powers that provides for check and balances among the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of government.29  The Japanese judiciary 
system resembles the structure of United States court systems, with trial 
courts, appellate courts, and a supreme court.30      
 
Japan was not an absolute stranger to democratic institutions and 
tendencies before the Second World War.  In fact, after the restoration of the 
Emperor Meiji to the Japanese throne in 1868, Japan embarked on a mission 
to “modernize” its political institutions based on Western examples.31  
Significant steps taken during the Meiji Restoration period include the 
adoption of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889, the creation of a 
national legislature known as the Imperial Diet in 1890, and the 
implementation of statutory codes based on Western European models.32  
Political parties also emerged during this period, challenging the established 
Japanese political order.33  Lawyers and formal legal education did not exist—
at least in the forms known in the West—until the Meiji Era.34  During that 
era, with the adoption of a new Western-based system, lawyers quickly came 
on the scene.35  As the legal system evolved, Japan experimented with citizen 
participation and jury trials for a short period between 1928 and 1943 pursuant 
to the pre-war Jury Act.36  The terms of the Japanese surrender in World War 
II promulgated in the Potsdam Declaration reflect the existence of these 
institutions as it refers to the removal of obstacles to “the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.”37 
 
During Japan’s post-war transformation, government and public 
officials benefitted from an increasing public trust that resulted from the 
country’s overall success.  This extended to the judiciary given that Japanese 
judges were generally regarded as intelligent, honest, politically independent, 
                                                 
28  Murai Ryōta, The Rise and Fall of Taishō Democracy: Party Politics in Early-Twentieth Century 
Japan, NIPPON COMM. FOUND. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a03302/.  
29  Court System of Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/Court_System_of_Japan/index.html (last visited July 2, 2017).  
30  Id.  
31  Murai Ryōta, supra note 28; see also Hahn, supra note 26, at 521. 
32  Murai Ryōta, supra note 28.  
33  Id. 
34  Hahn, supra note 26, at 518.  
35  Id. at 521. 
36  WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 14–15. 
37  Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration) (July 26, 1945). 
82 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
and professionally competent.38  In short, the Japanese judiciary comprised a 
“small, largely self-regulating cadre of elite legal professionals who enjoy 
with reason an extraordinarily high level of public trust.”39   
   
III. PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—DIAGNOSIS AND CONCEPTION PHASES   
 
Despite the country’s impressive recovery and substantial 
achievements in the post-war era, Japan’s economic momentum deteriorated 
considerably shortly before the turn of the twenty-first century due to a 
prolonged period of economic uncertainty, a swelling national debt, and 
political stagnation.40  In the 1980s, Japan’s economy experienced a rapid 
escalation in real estate and stock prices.  Japan’s Nikkei average eventually 
hit its all-time high in 1989.  Japan’s economy collapsed shortly thereafter in 
spectacular fashion as asset values plummeted, economic growth stalled, 
banking problems ensued, and Japan’s Nikkei stock average crashed.41  The 
economy had over-expanded during years of exorbitant growth.  As a result, 
the stock market dropped more than sixty percent and real estate values 
plummeted by nearly eighty percent in some cases.42  This phenomenon came 
to be known as Japan’s “bubble economy.”43  
 
Unable to immediately return to continuously sustained growth after 
the economic bubble popped, the country’s confidence was shaken.  
Moreover, Japan’s dominance in manufacturing and innovation was 
challenged by other Asian nations that were able to produce goods at much 
lower costs.44  The subsequent economic stagnation in Japan in the post-1989 
era came to be known as the “Lost Decade.”45  During this time, Japan began 
to work to address its problems and challenges. 
                                                 
38  John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in 
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).  
39  Id.  
40   WILSON ET. AL, supra note 5, at 5.  
41  Id.  
42  Brink Lindsey & Aaron Lukas, Revisiting the “Revisionists”: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese 
Economic Model, CATO INST. (July 31, 1998), https://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-
analysis/revisiting-revisionists-rise-fall-japanese-economic-model.  
43  MAURICE OBSTFELD, TIMES OF TROUBLES: THE YEN AND JAPAN’S ECONOMY 1985–2008, at 1 
(Koichi Hamada, et al. eds., 2011).  
44   Dan Rosen, Japan’s Law School System: The Sorrow and the Pity, 66 J. LEGAL ED. 267, 271 (2017).  
45  Eric Johnston, Lessons from When the Bubble Burst, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/01/06/reference/lessons-from-when-the-bubble-
burst/#.WgVFrIZrzdQ.  
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A. Genesis for Court and Legal Reforms 
Professor Feeley characterizes the first stage of court reform as 
diagnosis.  “Diagnosis is the process of identifying problems and considering 
solutions.”46  Diagnosis provides a foundation for applying the Feeley formula 
to analyze the potential success of a court reform.  Recounting the historical 
events underlying the movement for a specific legal and court reform can help 
in understanding the genesis for the reforms and likelihood of success.  
 
In the case of Japan, the diagnosis related primarily to sustained 
economic malaise as opposed to glaring problems with the criminal court 
system or popular agitation.  Japan’s criminal justice system had been 
generally praised by many for its stability, efficiency, and leniency.47  
Japanese society was comparatively safe and largely devoid of major criminal 
activity.48  Notwithstanding, the praise does not mean that Japan’s criminal 
justice system was perfect, or even that it lacked the need to change in the 
eyes of reformers.  In fact, some critics and reform-minded individuals had 
long sought constructive change to the criminal justice system.49  More than 
anything though, reformers and policymakers set out to find economic and 
societal solutions that would propel society forward.50  In the eyes of 
reformers, the country was carrying “enormous financial deficits and 
economic difficulties or a sense of some kind of social blockade.”51  This 
needed to be remedied, and legal reform was seen as a potential catalyst for 
change.  
 
Starting in the 1990s, after the economic “bubble” popped and 
appreciable economic growth did not appear imminent, Japanese 
policymakers and others diagnosed the source of its economic problems and 
considered possible solutions to spur economic growth.52  Although the 
official unemployment rate remained low, the Japanese economy appeared to 
                                                 
46  FEELEY, supra note 12, at 35–36. 
47  Dan Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 317–
18 (1992). 
48  As Crime Dries up, Japan’s Police Hunt for Things to Do, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21722216-there-was-just-one-fatal-shooting-whole-2015-crime-
dries-up-japans-police-hunt. 
49   WILSON ET. AL, supra note 5, at 36–37.  
50   Id. at 12–13.  
51  JUD. REFORM COUNCIL, THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE JUDICIAL REFORM II.2 (Dec. 21, 1999), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html [hereinafter THE POINTS AT ISSUE]. 
52   WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 6–7.  
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be running out of miracles.53  It would grow a little, stop, and then contract a 
little.54  To stimulate its economy, Japan slashed interest rates and invested 
massive sums on infrastructure and other public works.55  These attempts to 
lift Japan out of the lingering economic doldrums failed to gain the sustained 
traction desired by policymakers.56     
 
Calls for deregulation and administrative reform to combat the 
economic slowdown grew progressively louder.57  Previously, the 
government had endeavored to prevent excessive competition and corporate 
failure by heavily controlling market entry.58  This approach was now 
backfiring, while global competitive forces were putting pressure on Japan’s 
dominance. 59  Domestically, a response to the massive number of non-
performing loans and high bankruptcy rates was necessary.60  Unlike the past 
several decades, many felt that Japan could no longer rely heavily upon 
concentrated bureaucratic oversight and regular governmental intervention to 
achieve economic solutions.61  Instead, government bureaucrats were 
criticized for practicing a “unique form of state-directed insider capitalism” 
pursuant to which the government favored certain industries, controlled the 
allocation of capital, regardless of market signals, and helped prop up real 
estate and stock values.62  Unlike the praise that observers had offered when 
the Japanese economy was firing on all cylinders, bureaucratic interference 
and control quickly became broadly criticized.63  
 
B. Conceiving Solutions from a Legal Perspective 
 
The diagnosis stage outlined by Professor Feeley starts with 
identification of the problem and progresses to the exploration of potential 
solutions.64  Understanding that the country needed to address its enormous 
financial deficits, lingering economic difficulties, and challenging social 
issues, Japanese policymakers felt compelled to explore solutions from 
                                                 
53  Jim Impoco, Life after the Bubble: How Japan Lost a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/weekinreview/19impoco.html.  
54  Id.  
55  Lindsey & Lukas, supra note 42.  
56  Impoco, supra note 53.  
57   WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7.  
58   Id. at 6. 
59   Id. at 7. 
60   Id.  
61   Id.  
62  Lindsey & Lukas, supra note 42.  
63   Id.  
64  FEELEY, supra note 12, at 36. 
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diverse perspectives.65  The deregulation conversation initially focused on 
economic issue, but subsequently morphed into a deeper discussion, not only 
about scaling back governmental intervention in the private sector, but also 
about reevaluating Japan’s economic, administrative, political, and legal 
structures.66 
  
The judicial system was seen as “a social infrastructure indispensable 
for national life,” particularly in terms of its role to “support the free and fair 
activities of people by making rules and providing resolution of disputes.”67  
Thus, the observation that “economic circumstances are drastically and 
rapidly changing” in Japan led the government to conclude that the judicial 
system as then-constituted was incapable of adequately supporting economic 
activities.68  To enable the Japanese economy to stabilize and grow in the 
twenty-first century, the judicial system required drastic reform.69  Although 
talks of judicial reform initially focused on the civil justice system, these 
rapidly spread to a comprehensive analysis of both the civil and criminal 
justice systems.70      
  
In essence, reformers rationalized that Japan should expand the role of 
law to stimulate the economy and enhance participatory democracy.71  The 
justice system would benefit from greater access, user-friendliness, and 
increased citizen involvement and understanding.72  Reformers believed 
greater citizen involvement could help improve governmental transparency, 
increase public and private accountability, and inspire the private sector.73   
 
Through legal reform, the hope was that society would strengthen, the 
economy would grow, and the country could adequately prepare for domestic 
challenges.74  Becoming more responsive to complex and dynamic matters 
                                                 
65  THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, II.2. 
66   Id.  
67  MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE, AND INDUSTRY OF JAPAN, REPORT OF CORPORATE LEGAL SYSTEM 
STUDY GROUP FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (May 9, 2000), 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCorpMaine.html [hereinafter METI REPORT]. 
68  Id. (noting that “enterprises involved in economic activities are required to dynamically and rapidly 
cope with such change in such areas as the (i) implementation of corporate alliances, etc. for the purpose of 
revitalization of competitiveness in the international market, (ii) intensifying the corporate governance 
system, and (iii) modification of business models in response to globalization. . . .”). 
69  Id.  
70   Id.  
71  THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, I.1. 
72  See generally METI REPORT, supra note 67.  
73  THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, III.1. 
74  Id. I.1. 
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was also key.75  From a global perspective, reforms to the legal system could 
position Japan for an even greater role in the global community and enable it 
to respond to global issues more quickly and efficiently.76  Legal reform was 
increasingly viewed as a pathway to recovery.77  Accordingly, policymakers 
started paying attention to reforming laws, policies, legal institutions, and the 
courts. 
 
In time, Japan’s dominant political party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), together with big business, adopted the notion that the “rule of law” 
should displace the concept of “rule by law.”78  These groups agreed that the 
arsenal of solutions needed to be expanded beyond a deregulatory approach 
aimed only at economic revitalization.79  It also needed to include social, 
political, and legal reforms.80  An expanded arsenal of solutions was crucial 
in getting a larger package of judicial reforms, including the new saiban’in 
system, passed into legislation.81  The saiban’in system was consistent with 
the spirit of deregulation and empowerment of the individual given that the 
new system limits government involvement in criminal trials by shifting some 
of the legal responsibility to ordinary citizens.82 
 
IV. PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—INITIATION PHASE 
 
With some of its problem seemingly diagnosed and potential solutions 
under consideration, Japan moved into the second phase of planned change 
with respect to its court system—initiation—as defined in Professor Feeley’s 
book.  During initiation, “new functions are added or practices are 
significantly altered,” and, as observed in Japan, policymakers must decide 
which alternatives will be adopted, how programs will be financed, and who 
will oversee the changes.83  
                                                 
75  See generally METI REPORT, supra note 67.  
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77  Id. II.2. 
78  METI REPORT, supra note 67. 
79  THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, II.1. 
80  Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in 
Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 72, 90 (2010). 
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82  Corey & Hans, supra note 80, at 90 (citing Dan W. Puchniak, Perverse Main Bank Rescue in the 
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For Japan to successfully transition to a deregulated economy that 
relied on free-market mechanisms, citizens needed to trust the law and move 
forward without extensive governmental interference.  To better serve the 
private sector, courts needed better accessibility, greater transparency, and 
increased efficiency.  They also needed to be more responsive to global 
influences, which, in turn, could help Japanese competitiveness on an 
international scale.  In the past, Japan’s court system was slow in its case 
review and private attorneys were scarce.84  The legal system and the courts 
needed to adapt, and the size, quality, and breadth of the attorney pool needed 
to grow.85  
A. Creation of the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) 
Against this backdrop, the Justice System Reform Council was tasked 
with considering the future of law in Japan from the “people’s viewpoint.”86  
The JSRC was specifically designed to explore and propose tangible measures 
to reform the legal and justice system.87  To achieve this purpose, the Japanese 
government invited thirteen distinguished individuals from various political 
and economic sectors to join the JSRC to engage in detailed, high-level 
discussions about potential civic, legal, and judicial reforms.88  The invitees 
included a former chief justice of the Hiroshima High Court, a former chief 
prosecutor of the Nagoya Public Prosecutor’s Office, two members from the 
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japanese 
Association of Corporative Executives (the Keizai Doyukai), the former 
president of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the president of the 
Federation of Private Universities, a business professor from a private 
university, a popular writer, a vice president of the Rengo labor organization, 
and the president of the Federation of Homemakers (Shufuren).89  Diversity 
was one of the objectives of forming this particular group since different 
perspectives allow people to identify a wide range of problems and develop a 
variety of remedies. 
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Recognizing the potential for a major economic crisis, the JSRC noted 
that Japan had embarked on a course of structural reform including “political 
reform, administrative reform, [and the] promotion of decentralization and 
deregulation to enable Japan to recover its “‘creativity and vitality.’”90  In its 
own words, these reforms were intended to further economic development and 
ensure that every person would “participate in making a free and fair society” 
as a governing subject instead of a governed object.91  Culturally, however, 
this concept could be uncomfortable due to the involvement of, and reliance 
upon, a government deeply embedded in society through regulation along 
with other factors that deterred private citizens from pursuing justice.  For 
example, consumers were hesitant to expend the time and money necessary to 
navigate the obstacles inherent in the judicial process in order to sue big 
business.92 
 
1.  Goals of the JSRC 
 
In moving forward, the JSRC, in part, focused on “clarifying the role to 
be played by justice in Japanese society in the twenty-first century and 
examining and deliberating fundamental measures necessary for” realizing a 
justice system that is “easy for the people to utilize,” fosters “participation by 
the people in the justice system,” and achieves a strengthened and improved 
legal profession and justice system.93  The JSRC firmly believed that one of 
its fundamental tasks should be to distinctly define what must be done to 
“transform both the spirit of the law and the rule of law into the flesh and 
blood of this country, so that they become the shape of [the] country.”94  This 
reflects the transformational goal of reducing the role of government while 
empowering the individual.  Correspondingly, the group recognized the 
importance of a justice system that reinforces popular sovereignty, 
democracy, and respect for individuals as recognized in the Constitution of 
Japan.95 
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During its early stages, the JSRC identified a multitude of potential 
improvements for Japan’s justice system.  Chief criticisms of the justice 
system included the length of both criminal and civil proceedings; the lack of 
transparency in the justice system—particularly the closed nature of the 
criminal justice system; the inadequacy of legal counsel in terms of quantity 
and sophistication; the inability of the courts to adapt to the needs of society 
as it becomes more complex; the reality gap between the courts and the 
citizenry; as well as the perceived separation between the population and 
participants in the court system including judges, attorneys, and court staff.96  
Over time, complaints also emerged about the difficulties in using the justice 
system.97  Similarly, complaints materialized about the passivity of the 
judiciary and an overall inability to serve as a check on administrative 
agencies and other branches of government. 
 
In assessing the justice system, the JSRC quickly recognized the need 
to reinforce the function of justice in an “increasingly complex and diversified 
Japanese society” as well as the necessity of instituting changes to facilitate a 
more accessible and user-friendly justice system that “can respond to the 
expectations of the people and meet their trust.”98  In terms of access, there 
was a push for a legal aid system in a criminal context and a drive to make 
civil litigation more affordable. 99  Similarly, there was a push to expand 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.100  Public exposure to the system 
was considered vital—not only for the justice system, but also for stimulation 
of the private sector.101  Based on the JSRC’s enumerated goals and needed 
improvements for the existing system, reformers and JSRC members 
approached justice system reform with the mindset that this would be the 
“final linchpin” in a series of reforms that would restructure the shape of 
Japan—economically and otherwise—and empower it for the future.102   
 
The JSRC’s investigations revealed that improvements to the legal and 
court systems could alleviate the business world’s increasing frustration with 
inefficiencies and limited legal resources.103  Improvements could also help 
address the perceived inefficiencies, slowness, and high costs associated with 
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the judicial process.104  Lawsuits were slowed by hearings held sporadically 
over the course of months, if not years.  Filing fees for litigation were 
traditionally high and the number of lawyers with specialization was 
comparatively low.  Industry had long advocated higher quality legal 
assistance in the form of more well-rounded legal professionals.  It had also 
yearned for a more efficient, reliable, and credible dispute resolution system 
as part of facilitating commerce and economic development.  Much of the 
frustration of the private companies stemmed from cross-border comparisons 
with the legal and court systems of Japan’s Western counterparts. 
 
2. Recommendations of the JSRC and Legislative Change 
 
After sixty meetings and two years of substantive deliberations, the 
JSRC released its final report on June 21, 2001, which advocated for wide-
ranging recommendations for reform.105  The suggestions detailed in the 
report went far deeper into the legal and court system than even the reformers 
had imagined. 
 
The JSRC based its recommendations upon three pillars of fundamental 
reform.  First, the JSRC felt Japan needed a justice system that is “easier to 
use, easier to understand, and more reliable.”106  Second, to achieve these 
objectives, Japan should ensure that it has a legal profession “rich both in 
quality and quantity.”  Third, the country needed to develop a popular base in 
which citizens’ trust in the legal system is enhanced through their participation 
in legal proceedings and through other measures.107  
 
To effectuate these pillars of reform, the JSRC advocated expanded 
public access to the civil litigation system for purposes of achieving civil 
justice.108  The civil justice system needed to resolve disputes in a fairer, more 
proper, and more prompt manner.109  With respect to criminal justice, the 
JSRC believed that the system needed to be equipped to acquire the truth, 
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ensure the due process of law, and penalize promptly and properly when 
appropriate, while “obtaining the trust of the people.”110   
 
 In essence, the reformers saw the judicial system as an engine for 
propelling fundamental societal change.  It was believed that citizen 
participation in the judicial system could, in turn, function as one of the 
pistons in the engine of individual empowerment.  The JSRC envisioned that 
the judicial system and citizen involvement through the lay judge system 
would assume an enhanced role in helping shift Japan away from its 
traditional model of centralized control and bureaucratic regulation.111  The 
suggested reforms were consistent with the perceived need for Japanese 
citizens to not only break away from excessive dependency on the 
government, but also to develop greater civic consciousness and become more 
actively involved in public affairs.  Moreover, the JSRC felt that jury service 
would be an effective means of introducing community values and more 
common sense into the justice system.112 
 
As a result of the JSRC’s recommendations, the Diet of Japan passed 
the Shiho seido kaikaku suishin ho or “Justice System Reform Promotion 
Act,”113 facilitating the establishment of the Office for Promotion of Justice 
System Reform (“OPJSR”), which would take charge in enacting legislative 
reforms along the lines suggested by the JSRC.  Over the course of the next 
three years, the OPJSR assisted with the passage of twenty-four significant 
legal reforms.114  
 
The legal reforms adopted by Japanese legislators extended far beyond 
facilitating economic recovery through legal reform.  These recommendations 
included various civil litigation reforms starting in 2003.  These reforms were 
designed to accelerate the adjudication of civil cases,115 expand the 
jurisdiction of summary courts,116 improve the Code of Civil Procedure,117 
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and update the Arbitration Act.118  Reforms to the civil dispute resolution 
system also involved the establishment of a new Intellectual Property High 
Court, implementation of an amended labor dispute system in which labor 
affairs specialists handle adjudication together with the amendments to the 
administrative litigation system, and the addition of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms.119   
 
In 2004, as is common in the initiation phase of planned change, 
legislators dove into the criminal justice system, adding new functions and 
significantly altering practices.  For instance, Japanese policymakers created 
a lay judge system requiring citizen participation in serious criminal trials, 
enhanced its court-appointed defense counsel system, and implemented a new 
pretrial conference system designed to expand discovery as well as improve, 
accelerate, and streamline criminal trials.120  All of these reforms to the system 
would significantly impact the trial process.  In fact, these reforms essentially 
required a shift from a fairly docile trial process based on affidavits, 
prosecutor dossiers, and other written documentation into a more active trial 
proceeding involving more live, in-court testimony by witnesses.  
 
To achieve other parts of its three pillars of reform advocated by the 
JSRC, Japan significantly altered the legal system by passing legislation 
“aimed at increasing the number of legal professionals and improving the 
quality of the attorney pool through the establishment of . . . professional law 
schools.”121  Traditionally, the bar passage rate had ranged between two and 
three percent.122  An undergraduate or graduate degree in law was not a 
prerequisite to sit for the national bar examination, but those who wished to 
pass the bar exam focused their attention almost exclusively on the law. 123  
For someone seeking to become a lawyer, judge, or prosecutor, private “cram” 
schools had been the primary avenue for assistance.124  Again, a major reform 
changed the landscape of legal education as seventy-four institutions stepped 
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up to create “American-style” professional law schools that were separate and 
distinct from the nearly one hundred undergraduate and graduate faculties of 
law traditionally operated by various Japanese universities.125  Graduates from 
these law schools were promised a significantly higher chance to pass the bar 
examination in exchange for spending an additional two to three years 
studying law at these institutions.  The JSRC recommended these new schools 
not only to increase the number of bar passers, but also to diversify the legal 
profession.126  As a result, professionals law schools sought to admit 
applicants from varying backgrounds, different geographic regions, and a 
range of academic areas.127  
 
3. History of Citizen Participation in the Court System  
 
One of the most significant recommendations for reform, if not the most 
significant, was the addition of a new function in major crime cases—namely, 
so-called jury trials.  With the post-war United States occupation of Japan and 
American involvement in drafting the Constitution of Japan, many expected 
a jury system to return to Japan at the end of the Second World War.  Not only 
is the right to a jury trial constitutionally guaranteed in the United States 
federal and state court systems, but Japan had experimented with jury trials in 
certain criminal cases before the war.128  Between 1928 and 1943, Japan 
conducted 480 criminal jury trials in major crime cases.129  The original 
system failed to reach its full potential due to procedural and practical 
imperfections.  In 1943, the government officially suspended the Jury Act,130 
due to in large part to the rise of militarism and the government’s need to 
control criminal justice leading up to World War II.131  
 
Japan’s original venture into the realm of jury trials ultimately failed 
due to lack of trust.  Juror selection that was limited to wealthy and educated 
males undercut trust in the verdicts.  Moreover, the juries themselves had only 
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limited power.  The all-citizen jury of twelve male voters was asked only to 
answer questions regarding points of fact, which were ultimately adjudicated 
on a majority basis.132  Also, judges were not bound to accept the answers, 
and juries were not asked to render a verdict.133  Similarly, the judge could 
dismiss the jury at almost any time.  There was no right of appeal and 
defendants had to bear the jury’s expenses, therefore, the accused were not 
inclined to trust juries.134  At the end of the day, almost all criminal defendants 
waived their right to a jury trial.135  
 
The continuous suspension of meaningful citizen participation in the 
justice system for more than seven decades meant that the Japanese judicial 
system was essentially the exclusive domain of legal professionals with 
professional judges presiding over all trials at the district court and appellate 
levels.  The two exceptions to professional dominance included a brief period 
of jury trials in Okinawa,136 and largely unknown Kensatsu Shinsakai, or 
Prosecutorial Review Commissions (“PRC”).137  
 
During the period of United States administrative control of the Island 
of Okinawa, a number of American-style jury trials occurred in both civil and 
criminal cases between 1963 and 1972.138  Grand jury proceedings were held 
in Okinawa, and at least four civil jury trials were instigated by individuals 
without significant monetary resources or support against powerful domestic 
and foreign interests.139  This was noteworthy given that the American drafters 
neither guaranteed nor referenced trial-by-jury in the post-war Constitution of 
Japan.    
 
The impact of the PRC had been extremely limited.  Consisting of 
ordinary citizens, the PRC reviewed the propriety of a prosecutor’s decision 
not to prosecute a suspect if a victim or party of interest asked for such a 
review.140  If the PRC disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, 
it would then issue a recommendation to reconsider its decision not to 
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prosecute.141  Before the JSRC’s suggested reforms, these recommendations 
were not binding, so prosecutors only rarely changed their initial decision 
about prosecution.142  However, the adoption of the Lay Judge Act ushered in 
a modification to the PRC system.  
 
On a practical level, the saiban’in system was part of a comprehensive 
plan to revamp Japan’s justice system.  It was essentially the glue that bound 
together other criminal justice reforms proposed by the JSRC, including the 
expanded power of the PRC.  Pursuant to legislation enacted legislation on 
May 28, 2004, the PRC recommendations newly became binding on 
prosecutors.143  Together with the adoption of the new saiban’in system “for 
certain serious cases, under which the general public will participate in 
deciding cases together with judges,”144 these monumental changes ushered 
in a new era in criminal justice in Japan.  While these two reforms in isolation 
might not directly impact an individual defendant, they were significant to the 
expansion of democratic ideals within Japanese society.  
 
B. Reception of the Lay Judge System and Related Changes 
 
The initiation of the lay judge system was complicated.  Professor 
Feeley notes that during the initiation phase because “many changes in the 
criminal courts are initiated by outsiders, such as appellate court judges, 
legislators, and agency heads,” the original intent of planned changes can be 
“neglected or deflected” by institutions close to the courts which must 
implement the initiatives.145  Avoidance, evasion, and delay can often 
result.146   
 
Lay judge trials were proposed and initiated by outsiders to the criminal 
justice system.  Moreover, the JSRC combined with Japanese policymakers 
imposed the adoption of lay judge trials without significant public discussion 
or debate.147  There was no widespread popular movement or consensus to 
adopt jury trials, or even to include the citizenry in the judicial process on a 
greater scale.  At the same time, on a symbolic level, the introduction of lay 
judge trials further legitimized democratic engagement.  Practically, the 
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adoption of the lay judge system represented a democratic solution to a largely 
opaque criminal justice system and investment of trust in the citizenry.  This 
raised the question about whether the new saiban’in system would take root, 
or if it would simply end as an expensive experiment. 
 
Japanese society has had considerable time to digest and react to the 
formal reintroduction of meaningful citizen participation into justice system 
after the five-year preparatory period leading up to the first saiban’in trial.  
The resulting reactions were mixed.  Political reformers, bureaucrats, criminal 
attorneys, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and many scholars were 
noticeably excited and optimistic about the prospects underlying increased 
citizen participation and its potential impact on the criminal justice system.148  
On the other hand, the majority of Japanese citizens, the courts, the media, 
and others were much more critical.  In fact, before the first lay judge trial, 
the media became notorious for bashing the concept of lay participation in the 
criminal justice system.149     
 
Originally, the saiban’in system was viewed, most significantly, with 
suspicion by the populous and judiciary, the primary participants in the new 
system.  Opinion polls consistently confirmed the public’s distrust of the new 
system, lack of desire to participate, as well as its angst and fear.150  Skeptics 
of the new system contended that Japan’s reforms and sizeable investment in 
citizen participation would be futile due to cultural traditions and institutional 
impediments.151  Skeptics also predicted that the lay judges would fall short 
of expectations due to their lack of legal training, insufficient knowledge, and 
susceptibility to emotion and bias.152    
 
The judiciary adamantly maintained that the lay judge system was not 
created due to problems or discontent with the system.  It contended that the 
jurisprudential approach had been certain and consistent.  To a large degree, 
this approach had fostered societal stability and engendered trust in the 
Japanese judiciary over time.  At the same time, the press and critics had 
increasingly taken issue with the judiciary and justice system.  Although 
comparatively low, crime was increasing.  In Japan, the government has the 
ability to interrogate suspects for extended periods prior to formal arrest with 
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the intent of eliciting a confession that will facilitate an easier conviction.153  
A string of high-profile wrongful convictions resulting from forced 
confessions had raised troubling questions.154   
 
Concerns about the relative isolation and uniform background of most 
professional judges started resonating with the reformers.155  Lawyers, 
scholars, and even some former judges, raised additional concerns about the 
justice system.156  In the post-war era, Japan’s justice system became known 
for the symbiotic power relationship among the courts, the public prosecutor 
offices, and the police.  Some argued that this resulted in prosecutorial abuses 
and Japan’s incredible 99.9% conviction rate.157  Increased scrutiny 
highlighted previous criticisms that judges engaged in inadequate fact-
finding, relied on prosecutors, and failed to operate in a transparent manner. 
By shifting to a new system, some of these concerns could be addressed at 
least in the cases subject to the new lay judge system.  
 
V. PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—IMPLEMENTATION PHASE  
 
Japan expended significant energy and resources during the initiation 
phase due to the magnitude of the shift to lay judge trials.  Similarly, the 
implementation stage of this experiment with lay participation was intense as 
the country translated the abstract goals delineated by the JSRC into 
concrete policies.  
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Implementation necessarily “involves staffing, clarifying goals, and 
adapting to a new environment.”158  In his book, Professor Feeley notes that 
this stage entails the task of translating goals into practical policies.159   
Justice systems are built on certainty, stability, and predictability.  If change 
is significant, substantial challenges will arise given the disruption of 
common routines, interference with established authority, and emergence of 
uncertainties.160  Coordination and cooperation are key to achieving success.  
In the case of the lay judge system, the change was significant, leaving open 
questions about the prospects of coordination, cooperation, and ultimately 
success. 
 
A. Contours of the New Lay Judge System in Japan: Five-Year 
Development Period 
 
As Japan decided to significantly alter its court system during its 
initiation phase, policymakers needed to decide which alternatives to adopt, 
how to finance the programs, and who would oversee the implementation and 
operation of the lay judge system during the implementation phase.161  After 
some debate about whether to adopt an all-citizen jury model typical in Anglo-
American jurisdictions, such as the United States, or to embrace a mixed 
tribunal modeled after Continental-European jurisdictions, Japan embraced 
aspects of both models.162  Accordingly, Japan’s saiban’in system is a unique 
hybrid, which integrates elements of the common law jury and civil law mixed 
jury systems.163  Like common law jury systems including the petite jury in 
the United States, lay judges in Japan are randomly selected from voter lists 
and participation is limited to a single case.164  Unless excused by the court or 
excluded by peremptory challenge, participation is compulsory.165  Likewise, 
lay participants stand between the accused and the state rendering a verdict 
that can strip away life or liberty from the accused.  In other respects, though, 
the lay judge system mirrors civil law systems, such as the schoffe lay judge 
system in Germany or the echevin system in France, in which citizens 
participate in trials as lay judges alongside professional judges.166  
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The Lay Judge Act sets forth the parameters of the lay judge system 
including the serious crimes subject to this legislation.  Under this Act, a 
defendant charged with a crime prescribed in the Lay Judge Act cannot waive 
or avoid trial by a lay judge panel.167  In contested cases when the defendant 
enters a not guilty plea, the Act requires that six saiban’in or lay judges, 
chosen from among eligible voters, join three professional judges for a single 
“qualifying” criminal trial to adjudicate guilt or innocence.168  The nine-
person lay judge tribunals also collaborate to determine the sentence of a 
convicted defendant.169  By design, the lay judge system limits citizen 
participation to involvement in adjudicating certain serious criminal cases.170  
The reasoning underlying this decision largely lies in concerns about the 
citizenry’s ability to effectively participate in complex matters and the 
importance associated with adjudications involving a person’s liberty.171  
 
In uncontested serious criminal cases, four lay judges and one 
professional judge handle the matter.172  Through mutual communication and 
the exchange of ideas among the citizen judges and professional judges, the 
mixed tribunal is charged with determining guilt and sentencing.173  Pursuant 
to the Lay Judge Act, a guilty verdict requires a majority vote with the 
qualification that at least one professional judge and one lay judge must 
concur in the majority’s conclusion.174  For an acquittal, five votes are 
sufficient even if all of these votes come from the saiban’in or lay judges.175  
Procedurally, the prosecutor or defendant may appeal the verdict.176  
 
The selection of the citizen judges begins with each court generating a 
prospective lay judge list and summoning lay judges for service from the 
list.177  Exemptions from service may be granted based on a personal 
relationship with the case or related actor, lay judge service within the past 
five years, age over seventy, select occupations in government or law (in 
particular, Diet, ministers of state, city council members, lawyers, judges, 
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prosecutors, police officers, self-defense officers, and certain other 
government employees), status as a current student, appointment onto a 
prosecutorial review committee, and other individuals who are injured, sick,  
or who have unavoidable family or business obligations.178  Citizens are also 
exempt if they have not completed compulsory education in Japan, have 
committed a crime, or have mental or physical incapacities that would 
preclude them from serving.179  
 
The system is limited in several respects.  Although there is certainly 
room for expansion, lay judge trials in Japan have been applied only to certain 
major crime cases.  The lay judges are limited in what they can disclose about 
the proceedings.  Pursuant to the Lay Judge Act, the saiban’in have a strict 
duty of confidentiality, and face severe penalties for disclosing information 
about the trial and deliberations both during and after the trial.180  
 
B. Preparations for the System 
 
Needing the new system to succeed, Japan infused significant thought, 
preparation, and expense into the lay judge system’s implementation.  This 
preparation included both the actual physical facilities (courtroom expansion, 
construction of jury deliberation rooms, etc.) and other necessary preparations 
(e.g. development of systems, training, education, etc.).  Much consideration 
was given to the relationship among the professional and citizen judges.  The 
saiban’in system aimed to achieve fair and just results through professional 
judges contributing their legal expertise and the lay judges sharing their 
respective societal understanding, personal knowledge, and common sense 
experiences.  Theoretically, citizen judges would possess the same authority 
as the professional judges—both groups would determine facts and engage in 
sentencing.181  Through the chief judge, lay judges would even have the ability 
to question witnesses.182  However, legal and procedural matters are reserved 
for professionals due to their specialized training.183  
 
To effectively implement this new system, education was key.  
Professional judges required training on how to officiate over the trials while 
affording sufficient deference to the citizen participants.  Prosecutors and 
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criminal defense attorneys had never before addressed any type of jury.  Due 
to the significant differences between a traditional Japanese court proceeding 
and saiban’in trials, training was necessary for all lawyers participating in the 
saiban’in proceedings.  Both the Prosecutors Office and Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations (“JFBA”) constructed training programs, hosted mock trials, 
and held educational events.  Drawing from my own experiences as a trial 
attorney and law professor, I personally had the opportunity of assisting the 
JFBA with its training programs and even spearheaded several training events 
both before and after the first saiban’in trial.  In essence, this training was 
intended to help defense counsel and prosecutors make trials quicker and 
easier to understand for the lay judges. 
 
In addition to training lawyers and judges, it was necessary to educate 
the general public about the new system.  Before the first lay judge trial, the 
Japanese government (including the courts and prosecutors), together with the 
JFBA and other organizations, “spent well over USD $50 million promoting 
the new jury-like system to the public through billboards, print 
advertisements, television programs, Japanese manga (cartoons), Japanese 
anime (animations), a mascot, mock trials, symposiums, internet videos, and 
other means.”184  Mass media coverage of mock trials, symposiums, and any 
other developments related to the new system were unparalleled.185  Leading 
up to the first saiban’in trial in 2009, it seemed that there was information 
regarding the new system wherever one turned.  
 
Once the system had officially kicked off, media coverage about the 
saiban’in system started shifting from critical to quite positive.186  With a 
noticeable shift in the tone of press coverage, the opportunity for education 
and positive reinforcement through the mass media expanded.  Also, public 
education efforts have persisted. The Supreme Court, Prosecutors Office, and 
JFBA have produced educational materials and hold related events.187  Books, 
television shows, manga, and even video games centering on the saiban’in 
system have emerged.188   One prime example of efforts to bring the justice 
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system to the citizenry is the computer game developed by the Osaka Bar 
Association that gives players a “taste of what they may experience as a 
citizen judge.”189  Efforts like this are helpful given that candidates for lay 
judge service likely benefit from a greater awareness of legal procedures.  
 
VI. PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—ROUTINIZATION & EVALUATION 
PHASES   
 
An expansive body of theoretical literature has addressed the key 
components that determine the likelihood of success of a certain legal 
initiative.190  In the Feeley formula, the fourth phase of planned change relates 
to the routinization of a new program and the commitment by an institution 
to the program both financially and logistically.191  The fifth and final phase 
of the formula is related to the fourth phase, and therefore it is appropriate to 
address these together.  The fifth phase involves an evaluation or assessment 
of the prospects of success for a legal reform, and more specifically whether 
the reform will work on a long-term basis once it is routine.  In the words of 
Professor Feeley, “new programs are usually assessed during their 
experimental (the first three) stages rather than their routine periods (the 
fourth stage) . . . it tells us next to nothing about whether it will work.”192  
 
Whether an innovation is successful depends on “how it performs under 
this routine rather than under its initial conditions.”193  What possibly succeeds 
during the “exciting new experiment” period, may struggle once the 
innovative change has become the norm and the “halo” has worn off.194  If, 
for instance, the process of policy making and implementation is so strongly 
controlled by the players in the status quo from the very beginning, such that 
only those reforms which are acceptable to the players is likely to be 
introduced or succeed, and if the implementation is tightly and carefully 
managed by the status quo, then the introduced reform will likely become 
routinized with results that the status quo can be regarded as a success.  If the 
status quo does not agree with the changes, however, then the success of the 
reform as originally intended may be endangered.  
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A prime illustration of the status quo disagreeing fundamentally with 
one of the Japan’s recent transformative changes is the experiment with new 
professional law schools in Japan.  This major reform was enthusiastically 
embraced by many (including over seventy universities that created new law 
schools) and initially experienced success in drawing a wide-array of students 
and attracting legal talent into the classroom.  However, the new law schools 
have quickly backslid due to governmental interference, lower than advertised 
bar pass rates, reduced governmental funding, and opposition from within the 
legal profession to increased attorney numbers and perceived lower quality 
law graduates.195  Unfortunately, the existence of many of these new law 
schools will likely be short lived due to failed government promises and other 
countervailing forces.196  In terms of routinization, the question is whether the 
saiban’in system will follow the path of Japan’s ongoing experiment with law 
schools, or if the routinization of the system will follow a different path.   
 
A. Performance and Impact of the Lay Judge System    
 
Although the saiban’in system is not perfect and could benefit from 
some tweaking, it has succeeded on many levels since its inception in 2009.  
Fundamentally, the government has consistently endorsed the lay judge 
system.  Administratively, court planners have been sensitive to minimizing 
inconveniences to the citizenry.197  Legally, the Supreme Court of Japan 
rebuked constitutional challenges to citizen participation in the justice system 
and validated the new system.198  Operationally, professional judges on the 
trial court level have been cooperative and engaged.  Though not absolute, the 
appellate courts have typically been careful to protect lay judge verdicts 
despite a “prosecutor’s inclination to appeal unsuccessful cases.”199  In 
addition, many have been encouraged by the new system’s 
accomplishments.200     
 
In terms of satisfying the JSRC’s original goals and recommendations, 
the lay judge system has demonstrated substantial promise in its formative 
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years of its existence.  The goal of bringing the justice system closer to the 
citizenry has been accomplished.  Many of the fears and doubts expressed 
previously by critics have not materialized.  Many individuals have “greater 
confidence in the concept of public governance.”201  Participatory governance 
has demonstrated that the law and justice system can be accessible to ordinary 
citizens.  It showed that the citizenry is adequately educated to comprehend 
the law as it governs society.  The public has been able to explore and 
experience the legal system firsthand, thereby increasing transparency.  In 
turn, this transparency has focused the eyes of society on some of the 
perceived weaknesses of the justice system.  
 
In terms of serious crime trials, the lay judge system has functioned 
quite well in terms of direct benefits.  At the same time, the biggest successes 
can be attributed to the indirect benefits that have flowed from this 
monumental change to the criminal justice system.  In essence, the adoption 
of the saiban’in system was as the vehicle to effectuate a plethora of other 
reforms related to the justice system.  
  
1. Success During the Initial Years—the “Halo” Period 
 
The most impactful direct benefit of the lay judge system during its first 
five years or the “halo” period is likely educational.  The citizenry has a 
greater understanding of the justice system based on media coverage of, or 
actual participation in, the criminal trial process.  Media coverage of the 
criminal justice system since the adoption of lay judge trials has reached an 
unprecedented level.  Press and public interest in lay judge trials was rampant 
during the first five years of the new system, and the interest remains to this 
day. 
  
Individuals who have had a chance to participate first-hand have gained 
a greater understanding of the criminal justice system.  “Between May 2009 
and February 2014, the names of 1,737,106 citizens appeared on the lay judge 
rolls.  Of these, a total 48,345 citizens served either as lay judges (36,027 
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people) or alternate lay judges (12,318 people).”202  By the end of 2016, 
54,964 citizens had served as lay judges.203 
 
Although the system is still in its infancy, this direct exposure has 
generated an increasing amount of data facilitating governmental reports 
about cases and official surveys of lay judges.  Scholarly analysis is 
widespread, and the news media has developed a pattern of diligently tracking 
and reporting the progress of the system.  Lay judges have also assisted, albeit 
in a limited capacity, in getting the word out.  Despite a strict confidentiality 
requirement mandating that lay judges remain silent with respect to their 
deliberations or otherwise face a fine and/or imprisonment, a practice has 
arisen for lay judges to give press conferences about their experiences.204  At 
the press conferences, lay judges voluntarily discuss their reactions to what 
they heard and discuss their general experiences.  Despite the limitations on 
what a lay judge can say, the press continues to cover their reactions, thereby 
helping to educate the populace.205  Collectively, the flow of information has 
increased substantially thereby enriching the public’s awareness of the justice 
system and promoting an in-depth discussion about critical social issues 
related to the criminal justice system.  This has solidified the democratic 
processes promoted by citizen participation in government and instilled a 
heightened trust in the truth-finding process and due process of law.  
 
The swift acceptance of public involvement in the justice system has 
been encouraging. Japan made a major commitment to the lay judge system 
by providing funding and a solid base of operations from the start.206  This 
commitment did not change during the first five years of the saiban’in system.  
Accordingly, without any noticeable major hiccups, citizen participation in 
serious crime trials quickly became integrated into the Japanese criminal 
justice system.  Lay judges willingly deliberated alongside professional 
judges making collective decisions, reaching verdicts, and issuing sentences.  
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Through February 2014, [lay] judges had been involved in 7,868 
serious criminal cases and rendered verdicts in 6,392 of them.  
The most common type of cases [were] robbery resulting in 
bodily injury (1,883 cases) and murder (1,644 cases).  Among 
the verdicts rendered, lay judge tribunals found a total of 6,222 
defendants guilty (among which 21 people were sentenced to 
death)[,] . . . found 33 defendants not guilty, [and] the remainder 
of the cases were transferred to family court, otherwise 
resolved[,] or dismissed.  Approximately 35[%] of the verdicts 
[were] appealed.207  
  
  The system itself has benefited from citizen involvement.  Lay judges 
have approached their task with much seriousness.  They have confronted 
each trial with diligence and sincerity.208  This honest approach has led to 
“clear signs [that] careful attention” is being applied to deliberations, “the 
presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt standards.”209  Achieving the 
presumption of innocence in the Japanese criminal system is a giant leap 
forward. 
 
  There are also concrete indications that citizen service in the courtroom 
enhances trust in the criminal justice system.  Almost uniformly, Japanese 
citizens have spurned the idea of lay judge service when questioned by 
pollsters. 210  Almost always, this sentiment disappears once a citizen has 
served alongside professional judges in a saiban’in trial.  In fact, citizens 
serving as lay judges have uniformly praised their experience.  In surveys 
regularly conducted by the Supreme Court every year, over ninety percent of 
lay judges characterize their actual courtroom experience as positive or 
extremely positive during the first five years of the new system.211  This 
outcome has continued.  In fact, the Supreme Court survey conducted in 2016 
showed that among those citizens who did not want to participate in a lay 
judge trial before serving, their post-trial sentiment had shifted 
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considerably.212  Among this group, 56.8% of the lay judges felt that it was an 
“extremely good” experience, 38.5% felt it was a “good” experience, 2.1% 
felt that it wasn’t the best experience, 0.8% felt that it was a bad experience, 
0.5% didn’t have any feelings about the experience, and 0.8% did not respond 
to the question.213 
 
  Citizen judges have remarked that their civic service enabled them to 
learn much, seriously reflect on important issues facing Japanese society, and 
even educate others.214  Consistent with the objectives underlying the new 
system, the educational value of lay judge participation has been clear.  Some 
of the feedback has included how the lay judge experience has led to a greater 
understanding of the court system and its participants.215  Others have 
appreciated the opportunity to engage with other members of the community 
for a common purpose.216  Overall, all stakeholders in the process have 
benefitted from the integration of common sense and differing perspectives 
into the trial process.  
 
2. Beyond the First Five Years—Direct Impact on Citizenry 
and Outcomes  
 
Notwithstanding the positive hype, press coverage, and circumstances 
underlying this exciting new experiment, the saiban’in system’s direct impact 
is hindered by its limited scope.  Only three percent of all criminal cases are 
heard by lay judges.217  Saiban’in do not participate in civil or administrative 
litigation.  This limited scope hinders more citizens from directly interacting 
with the justice system.  Japan has a unique opportunity to advance 
participatory democracy through expansion of its lay judge system and with 
its initial successes has demonstrated how this is possible. 
 
Given the momentum of its new lay judge system, now is a prime time 
for Japan to consider expanding citizen participation into the civil justice 
realm.218  Expanding the scope of citizen involvement in the justice system 
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would be consistent with the goals set forth by the JSRC.219  In terms of an 
expanded scope, Japan could target lawsuits that have a major societal impact.  
The citizenry would likely welcome the opportunity to participate in 
administrative litigation or impactful cases involving environmental disasters, 
mass torts, nuisance, breach of privacy, the unauthorized disclosure of 
personally identifiable data, professional negligence resulting in injury or 
death, and other similar claims. 
 
Japan is ready for expanded citizen engagement.  The lay judge system 
has been admittedly successful in its implementation.  From an educational 
standpoint, the public has been inundated with information about jury service 
over the past decade so they should be primed for further participation.  
Logistically, the country has made preparations to accommodate juries in its 
courtroom facilities.  Through expansion, Japan can obtain many of the same 
benefits on the civil side that have been experienced in a criminal context.  
Not only will more citizens be directly exposed to the justice system, but they 
can also infuse common sense and societal values into the system.  Moreover, 
if citizen participation was introduced into the civil justice system, even on a 
limited basis, it could bring society even closer to self-governance while 
simultaneously strengthening the democratic foundations of society, 
promoting justice, and helping ensure equitable results in individual cases 
even further.  It could also help quell increasing public frustration with 
governmental inaction.  Accountability in the public and private sectors could 
increase thereby diminishing problematic conduct.  This is the next logical 
step for Japan in continuing to advance the goals underlying its legal reforms.  
 
In terms of direct impact on the criminal justice system, the trial 
outcomes have essentially remained the same.  In saiban’in cases, the 
conviction rate has continued to hover around Japan’s notoriously high 
conviction rate of 99.9% during the first eight years of its existence.220  To the 
chagrin of criminal defense attorneys and certain observers, this outcome has 
been disappointing.  However, it might be argued that the circumstances have 
changed because prosecutors have become even more cautious and selective 
in the number of cases brought to trial.  
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Sentences by the saiban’in tribunals have been largely equivalent to 
previous cases tried exclusively by professional judges.221  Sentences in 
serious sex crimes have, however, been harsher.222  The consistency in 
sentencing has resulted from fairly strict controls by the status quo.  More 
specifically, the courts have insisted on the use of a national sentencing 
database, and the Supreme Court has given specific directions.223  Also, the 
first lay judge case overturned by the Supreme Court involved the conviction 
of parents for child abuse causing bodily injury resulting in death.224  In this 
case, the lay judge panel imposed a term of imprisonment longer than that 
requested by the prosecutor.225  The panel justified its sentence based on the 
history of child abuse, attitude of the defendants in shifting the blame, and the 
lack of similar cases in the national sentencing database.226  Social attitudes 
further justified the harsher sentence.227  The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the lay judge system was introduced to better reflect the views of 
“common people” with respect to the commission of crimes such that different 
sentences might be fully expected, and that the panel must fully examine and 
consider the sentencing standards of prior cases.228  In this case, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the panel failed to show the basis for more severe 
sentencing.229          
 
Although there is relative uniformity in sentencing, different 
perspectives have been incorporated into the trial process.  Judges have 
appreciated citizen input and worked together with the lay judges without 
substantial objections or alarm.230  In fact, citizen participation in the lay judge 
system has legitimized governmental action and verdicts.  The use of lay judge 
trials has resulted in a renewed emphasis on central tenets of justice including 
fairness, accuracy, and the presumption of justness.  With the outside spotlight 
on the professional judges both in the courtroom and deliberation room, in-
depth analysis and extra judicial care are natural consequences.  The inclusion 
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of individuals from varied backgrounds into lay judge tribunals better reflects 
the composition of society and goes beyond the diversity of the elite who tend 
to make up the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
 
3. Beyond the First Five Years—Indirect Impact of Change 
 
Although the lay judge system’s direct impact on the outcomes of a 
comparatively few number of individual criminal trials has been relatively 
minimal, the real value of this major court reform has been indirect, or at least, 
specifically designed to complement a transformed criminal justice system.  
These “indirect” benefits include improvements to court procedures, 
transparency, better efficiency, and attention by the courts to evidence, facts, 
and justice.  
 
The saiban’in system stimulated reforms in various aspects of the 
criminal pretrial process.231  Reform was necessary for the system to succeed.  
These reforms included the adoption of pretrial coordination procedures, the 
increased use of recordings during interrogations, expanded discovery rights 
for defendants, and relaxed bail reform.232  It also led to the creation of a legal 
aid program to provide counsel for indigent suspects.233  
 
The impact of procedural changes associated with the lay judge system 
have been striking.  Before inception of the lay judge system in 2009, all 
criminal trials were discontinuous proceedings held on random days over the 
course of months (if not years) in which professional judges simultaneously 
considered the facts, guilt, and sentencing.  Now, lay judge trials are 
concentrated and occur on consecutive days.234  After the consolidation of the 
trial process, the saiban’in trial hearings took an average of 5.6 consecutive 
days in 2016.235  The deliberations took an average 10.4 hours in 2016.236  
 
To increase efficiency and facilitate a speedy trial on consecutive days, 
“[t]he Lay Judge Act stipulates that all cases subject to lay judge trials shall 
be subject to a mandatory pretrial process, known as kouhanmae seiri 
tetsuzuki or pretrial conference procedures, that must occur before the start of 
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trial.”237  Courts now hold pretrial meetings to identify contested issues, 
outline a concrete plan for trial, and facilitate greater exchange of evidentiary 
material in advance of trial.238  In the pre-saiban’in trial era, prosecutors only 
needed to disclose materials that they planned on introducing at trial.239  
Contradictory statements or harmful materials often never came forth.  At 
least to some degree, this has changed.  To a large degree, the pretrial 
proceedings have helped increase transparency and satisfy the constitutional 
promise of the right to a speedy trial.  These proceedings have helped increase 
efficiency and minimize the duration of lay judge trials.240  Although not 
compulsory in criminal cases that do not qualify for saiban’in treatment, the 
courts’ use of this procedure has also expanded to non-saiban’in cases in 
which the accused pleads not guilty and the parties disagree regarding the 
evidence to be introduced at trial.241    
 
Another procedural point of impact has been an emphasis on orality and 
directness, as seen in an increased importance placed on live witnesses and 
oral testimony.242  Under the previous system, the professional judge panels 
“relied heavily on written materials [and evidence], including the prosecutor’s 
investigation dossier.”243  The prosecution would meticulously develop its 
dossier and structure it to best realize a conviction.244  Over defense counsel’s 
vigorous objections, “judges generally accepted the dossier into evidence with 
little [or no] reservation.”245  With the adoption of lay judge trials, the tribunals 
rely comparatively less on prosecutorial dossiers, and much more on live 
witness testimony.  Hearings on consecutive days now enable the professional 
and lay judges to analyze live testimony and written evidence in a cohesive 
fashion.  Notwithstanding the notable improvements, professional judges 
have sometimes reverted to their old habits of allowing prosecutors to read 
investigative materials and confessionary statements aloud in court instead of 
requiring the direct questioning of witnesses, investigators, and other relevant 
individuals. 
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 Another procedural benefit realized through citizen participation has 
been the increased emphasis on communication.  Because ordinary citizens 
are now involved in the adjudication process, the attorneys and professional 
judges have strived to communicate with citizen jurors in understandable 
terms by using plain language throughout the proceedings.  This has been an 
ongoing emphasis associated with the saiban’in system.  In fact, special 
training sessions on lay judge communication continue to be held for criminal 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges.  
 
  The newfound transparency in the criminal justice system has opened 
the door to both scrutinizing the flaws in the judicial process and seeking 
solutions for such flaws.  With increased attention, society has become aware 
of important issues such as forced confessions and capital punishment.  This 
has already resulted in changes in practice, procedure, and the law. 
 
Since the inception of lay judge trials, intense scrutiny has been placed 
on forced confessions and flaws in the interrogation process.  In 2016, the Diet 
finally passed a law requiring the government to take measures within three 
years to record, in its entirety, the interrogation process of any defendant who 
is subject to a saiban’in trial or any case being investigated by a special 
prosecutor squad.246  To date, investigators record interrogations at their own 
discretion or not at all.247  In response to calls for reform in preparation for lay 
judge trials, Japanese police only started recording interrogations in 2008.248  
By 2015, the police still recorded less than fifty percent of interrogations in 
lay judge cases, and recording was often selective.249  This will change 
pursuant to this new legislation.  Now, police must record all interrogations 
conducted during investigations of alleged crimes to qualify for a lay judge 
trial.250  This requirement will only apply to crime cases subject to the Lay 
Judge Act, illustrating how the lay judge system has indirectly impacted the 
greater legal system.251 
   
Since the inception of lay judge trials, all murder defendants have been 
tried by mixed tribunals.  This is a major difference from past practice in 
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which three professional judges tried everyone accused of murder.252  Along 
these lines, there has been a renewed discussion about capital punishment in 
Japan.253  Often shrouded in secrecy, public involvement in adjudicating 
crimes that qualify for the death penalty has added another dimension to 
public scrutiny and discourse.254  As lay judge trials have resulted in death 
sentences, there have been renewed calls from the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations, certain segments, and even former lay judges to reconsider and 
even abolish the death penalty.255      
 
4. Working on the Imperfections and Challenges   
 
 Notwithstanding the “excitement and fanfare” of this new experiment, 
there is still room for improvement.256  During the initial phases of the routine 
period, Japan continuously evaluated the saiban’in system.  The enabling 
legislation of the new system called for a comprehensive evaluation in 2012—
only three years into the new system’s existence.  Accordingly, the General 
Secretariat of the Supreme Court issued its fifty-page three-year evaluation in 
December 2012.257  Additionally, Japan continues to evaluate of the saiban’in 
system.  The Supreme Court’s efforts constantly monitor the challenges and 
successes of the system through research, polling of citizen judges, and other 
initiatives.258 
 
In its evaluative report, the Supreme Court concluded that the new 
system was functioning comparatively well.259  The rollout had been 
successful, the new system was stable, and the outcomes of the new system 
were consistent with the outcomes of the previous criminal justice system.260  
There was no suggestion that the new system needed to be subject to a major 
reconstruction or even scaled back.  The tone of the report was positive, and 
in fact seemed to conclude that many of the concerns that existed before the 
roll-out of the system were not as serious as originally feared.  The reasons 
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underlying the initial success stemmed largely from the value provided to the 
system by citizen participation.  The lay judges engaged enthusiastically 
during the trial process in terms of their desire to understand, willingness to 
work hard, and eagerness to speak up during the deliberations.261  In fact, the 
Supreme Court noted that more than ninety-five percent of the lay judges felt 
that participation on a mixed jury was a valuable experience.262 
 
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s three-year evaluation noted a 
broad array of concerns and issues that needed to be addressed.263  There were 
growing concerns about an increasing number of lay judges either seeking 
exemption or excusal from jury service, or rather simply more citizens who 
were failing to show up for service despite receiving a summons.264  As 
detailed below, this challenge has progressively grown over the past eight 
years.  During the first few years of the system, the populous was 
comparatively diligent in their responsiveness to calls to serve as a saiban’in.  
Subsequently though, citizen participation has trended in a downward fashion.  
In 2016, according to the Supreme Court of Japan, the proportion of those 
who refused to serve rose to nearly sixty-five percent.265  This is a twelve 
percent decrease in participation compared to when the lay judge system 
officially started in 2009.266  
 
One of the main reasons cited for refusing to serve is a proliferation of 
non-traditional employment in Japan.267  Such employment arrangements 
make it difficult to take time off of work.  Another reason is the increasing 
length of trials.268  Although most lay judge trials finish within a week, this 
can feel like an inordinate amount of time away from work in light of the 
country’s work culture.269  Even more significantly, longer and more complex 
trials can provide individual challenges and also draw negative press.  In 2017, 
the highly publicized and complex trial of Chisako Kakehi was scheduled to 
be lengthy.  Ms. Kakehi was charged with the murder or attempted murder of 
four men with whom she had engaged in a relationship—marital or others.  
Her trial was scheduled to span 135 days and include fifty hearings and more 
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than fifty witnesses.270  To fill the citizen lay judge spots, the district court 
summoned 920 individuals for prospective service.271  More than eighty 
percent of those summoned refused to serve.272  
 
At the same time, courts have likely compounded the problem of 
saiban’in service by permitting prospective lay judges to decline.273  While 
such leniency may be the result of courts fearing the consequences of a 
citizenry that feels it is forced to serve, the unwillingness to insist on 
participation could lead to long-term problems with the system.  This is 
particularly likely given that opinion polls demonstrate acceptance of the 
system increases significantly when a person serves as a lay judge.274   
 
Other topics addressed in the Supreme Court’s evaluative report in 
2012 focused largely upon the burdens on lay judges, such as concerns about 
increasingly longer trials, the strict confidentiality obligation, the mental toll 
exacted by jury service, and accommodations.275  It also noted potential 
procedural issues involving opening arguments, investigation of evidence, 
handling of deliberations, structure of judgments, cases involving the death 
penalty, appeals, and other matters.276  As the system becomes even more 
routine, the government’s mission is tackling these challenges and improving 
the system.  
 
Aside from the Supreme Court’s report, observers have focused on a 
host of areas for potential improvement.  To further enhance participatory 
democracy and the educational benefits of citizen engagement, Japan might 
consider relaxing the strict lifetime confidentiality obligations imposed on the 
lay judges to facilitate transparency and greater accessibility.  Saiban’in are 
subject to significant fines or imprisonment for leaking any confidential 
information learned during jury service, any part of the lay judge panel’s 
deliberations, opinions or identities of other lay judge members, or personal 
opinions about the panel’s findings or weight that should have been attributed 
to the evidence.277  Prohibiting citizen jurors from communicating their trial 
experience with others can be harmful to their health, particularly in serious 
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criminal trials.  Japan has attempted to combat this by offering free 
counseling, a hotline, and other means of enhancing psychological 
assistance.278  Just as significantly, for the saiban’in system to have the 
maximum impact, former lay judges need to talk about their experiences 
freely.279  Strict confidentiality standards reduce the multiplier effect that 
might be expected from conversations with family members, friends, 
workplace colleagues and others.  Absent relaxed standards, the flow of 
information and positive effects of transparent civic service are hindered.280 
 
With respect to evidentiary matters, the availability of materials to the 
defense has increased significantly, particularly in comparison with the pre-
saiban’in system era.281  Despite improved transparency, prosecutors can still 
refrain from producing potentially harmful evidence.  The pretrial 
proceedings tend to inhibit lay judges from seeing and considering all relevant 
materials because professional judges can exclude materials in an effort to 
streamline actual trial hearings.282  For purposes of obtaining justice and 
providing the lay judges with all relevant information, greater disclosure is 
desirable.  Although expediency can decrease the burden on the lay judges, 
there should be no substitute for a defendant’s right to a fair and complete trial 
in the name of expediency.  
 
Another concern is whether procedural defects or obstacles caused by 
compromises reached in the creation of the system will inhibit systematic 
success.  Professor Feeley emphasized such a concern in his work.283  In 
essence, the development of the lay judge system was a compromise in terms 
of its structure due in large part to objections from the status quo.  Although 
some would have preferred an all-citizen jury, Japan opted for a mixed 
tribunal system whereby three professional judges have the opportunity to 
oversee and work directly with six citizen judges.  Naturally, these 
experienced adjudicators have the unfettered ability to control interpretations 
of evidence behind closed doors.  Holding firm to the viewpoint that the 
existing system was sufficient, there was little impetus for change beyond 
acknowledging that educating people through participation would have 
benefits.  In the eyes of the judiciary, meaningful public input into the verdict 
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and sentencing was not necessarily the desired goal.  Along these same lines, 
it is noteworthy that certain verdicts are not possible without at least one 
professional judge joining the lay judges.  
 
Since the first lay judge trial in 2009, observers have expressed 
concerns related to lay judges including the length of the trials, financial losses 
due to missed work, and psychological harms from being exposed to 
gruesome evidence.284  Without question, it is important to reduce the burden 
on the citizenry in order to generate support and buy-in for the new system.  
However, lay judge service should not be discounted such that procedure 
overtakes substance.  For citizens adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a 
fellow citizen, the main priority should obtaining justice efficiently.  When 
dealing with the life and liberty of the accused, the system must provide every 
opportunity for due process.  Additionally, participatory democracy requires 
active engagement and sacrifice.  A few days of lay judge service for the 
betterment of society should be viewed as a privilege and civic duty.  Again, 
lay judge surveys demonstrate citizens share this view once they have served.  
 
Finally, in considering the search for truth and due process, the structure 
of the current system can be viewed as a weakness.  Some have voiced 
significant worries about the potential for tainting a verdict by not bifurcating 
the trial process so that sentencing is done only after a guilty verdict has been 
reached.285  Splitting the verdict stage from the sentencing stage avoids 
potential prejudice to the determination of guilt especially where evidence 
relevant only to sentencing is inflammatory.  Evidence inapplicable to a 
determination of guilt includes evidence of prior crimes or victim impact 
statements.  It also includes trial participation by victims or victim 
representatives, which is now allowed in saiban’in trials pursuant to the wave 
of court system reforms undertaken by Japan.286  Although bifurcation is often 
discussed in the context of concern about citizen jurors’ inability to mentally 
separate the prejudicial impact of previous crimes or impassionate pleas from 
victims, the lack of separation potentially impacts professional judges as well.  
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VII. CONCLUSION   
 
 The saiban’in system has taken a firm hold in Japanese society and has 
benefitted both individuals and society alike.  Going forward, the system holds 
great promise of future success as well.  Judicial reform and citizen 
involvement in government have been viewed as a means of spurring private 
sector economic activity by reducing governmental influence and power.  
Whether these goals will be fully realized remains to be seen.  
 
 In the context of the Feeley formula, it is necessary to continue 
evaluating the sustained prospects for success and monitor the potential 
pitfalls that might stand in the way of the saiban’in system.  Centralized 
control of the new system and well-defined duties of actors could hinder the 
continuing development of this major reform if its purposes are neglected or 
forgotten.287  Moreover, because the government has continued to emphasize 
efficiency, another concern is whether all of the intended effects and benefits 
of the new system will be realized.288  
 
 At the same time, the likelihood of success has been bolstered by the 
large and sustained investment made in the new system.  This includes 
structural facilities, operating budgets, and commitment.  The saiban’in 
system also benefits from the efforts of highly trained professionals within the 
court system who oversee the system and perform complex tasks.  The rollout 
and operation of the system has been surprisingly smooth.  Although the 
opportunity exists for expansion of the system, the comparatively small 
number of saiban’in trials to date has also likely contributed to the sustained 
success of the system given that these professionals have been able focus on 
any issues or challenges that might arise. 
 
 Building on the momentum of the lay judge system, Japan should 
seriously consider expanding citizen participation into the legal decision-
making process in civil trials.  Through expansion, Japan can obtain many of 
the same benefits on the civil side that have been experienced in a criminal 
context.  Also, not only can more citizens be directly exposed to the court 
system, but they can also infuse common sense and societal values into the 
system.  This is the next logical step for Japan in continuing to advance the 
goals underlying its legal reforms.  
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